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Abstract. The object of this interview is the history of the Large
Hadron Collider in the LEP tunnel at CERN, from first ideas to the dis-
covery of the Brout-Englert-Higgs boson, seen from the point of view of
a member of CERN scientific committees, of the CERN Council and a
former Director General of CERN in the years of machine construction.
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1 The Spp¯S Collider and LEP
L. B. During the 1980s, at the time when LEP, the Large Electron Positron collider,
was being completed, you began to be deeply involved with CERN. . . 1
⋆ The text presented here has been revised by the authors based on the original oral history
interview conducted by Luisa Bonolis and recorded in Rome, Italy, 1–3 March 2016.
a e-mail: luciano.maiani@roma1.infn.it
b e-mail: lbonolis@mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de, luisa.bonolis@roma1.infn.it
1 We are indebted to Prof. Dieter Haidt for very informative exchange on the arguments
discussed in this Section.
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L. M. Nicola Cabibbo had been in the Scientific Policy Committee (SPC) in
the 1970s, when they had advised CERN to approve the construction of the proton-
antiproton collider proposed by Carlo Rubbia and Simon van Der Meer to search for
the Intermediate Vector Bosons. It was a difficult machine and the positive recom-
mendation of the SPC was a far-sighted decision.
The pp¯-project of Rubbia, initiated in 1976, was based on the conclusion that with
the unified theory of the electroweak interactions [Glashow 1961][Weinberg 1967][Salam 1968]
and the measurement of sin 2θ from Gargamelle, the predicted mass of the charged
intermediate vector boson W was around 70 GeV, requiring a proton-antiproton col-
lider to reach such energies. However, at FermiLab, Bob Wilson was not interested
in the project. Rubbia, after strong opposition, convinced finally Le´on van Hove and
John Adams of a pp¯ collider, at the CERN SPS, based on the Stochastic Cooling
project of Simon van der Meer.
The Spp¯S started operation in 1981, after only 5 years of construction. An immedi-
ate outcome was the appearance of narrow jets even in a hadron machine [Banner et al. 1982],
a possibility doubted earlier by prominent physicists and a strong confirmation of the
reality of confined quarks and gluons in the hadrons. The observation of W and Z,
with predicted masses and other properties followed in 1983, see e.g. [Di Lella & Rubbia 2015].
I was elected in the Scientific Policy Committee of CERN in 1984, after Nicola,
when the Large Hadron Collider was first considered in the SPC as the next CERN
large facility.
In those years, we realised that the way to go to higher energies was with p − p
rather than p − p¯ colliders or e+e− colliders. At energies above LEP, there are so
many gluons in a proton or in an antiproton that new particle production will be
dominated by gluon-gluon fusion. It was a great simplification: you would not need
quark-antiquark annihilation, as was the case at the Spp¯S, and all the gymnastic
around antiproton beam cooling could be avoided. Also, due to asymptotic freedom,
we understood that a hadron machine could be almost as effective as an electron-
positron machine to disentangle the basic particle reactions. So it didn’t pay to go
beyond LEP with electron-positron, the next machine could be proton-proton.
L. B. The years 1980s saw the realisation in Europe of two big high energy
machines, HERA at DESY and LEP at CERN. How was discussion and planning of
two such large enterprises organised?
L. M. The scene was set by the rising of the Standard Model in the 1970s after
the discoveries of neutral weak current neutrino events and of charm, see e.g. the
reconstruction presented in [Maiani 2017].
New particles were expected to be observed at high energy (W and Z, new quark
and lepton flavours) and the theoretical progress after the discovery of asymptotic
freedom called for better experiments at higher energy, to test the detailed predictions
about the violations of Bjorken scaling described by the Altarelli-Parisi equations
[Altarelli & Parisi 1977][Dokshitzer 1977][Gribov & Lipatov 1972].
Large projects unavoidably entail long and international consultations and prepara-
tory steps. The natural forum for these discussions was ECFA2. The politics was not
restricted to a single laboratory. DESY, under the leadership of Herwig Schopper,
had become a fully European Laboratory, competing with CERN for dimensions and
scientific results.
At the beginning of the 1980s, Schopper left DESY to become DG at CERN and
Volker Soergel became director of DESY. Both laboratories had running machines:
1. DESY: PETRA was running since 1978 (until 1986) and the next step had to be
discussed;
2 European Committee for Future Accelerators.
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2. CERN: SPS running since 1976 and Spp¯S started 1981 and the next step had to
be discussed.
It was an option for DESY to build an e+e− machine near to Hamburg, since there
was a long tradition of electron colliders at DESY, just as was for hadron accelerators
at CERN.
The decision eventually went at CERN in favour of (the future) LEP. Instead,
an electron-proton machine was proposed (1983/4) for DESY, which became HERA
under the leadership of Soergel and of Bjorn Wiik, who later, in 1993, succeeded
Soergel as Director of DESY.3
The construction of the Large Electron-Positron collider at CERN started in
September 1983, under the direction of Emilio Picasso, with Schopper Director Gen-
eral. The first collisions were observed on July 4th, 1989, and the first Z0 on August
23 of the same year. At the time, the direction of CERN had passed to Carlo Rubbia.4
L. B. Which were the main goals of LEP?
L. M. Initially, LEP was to be focused at the Z0 mass (that is at a total center-of-
mass energy of about 90 GeV), to study the neutral mediator of the weak interactions
discovered at the Spp¯S, which was expected to be abundantly produced in electron-
positron annihilation. This phase was called LEP I, to be followed by a second phase,
LEP II, where the energy would be increased to around 200 GeV.
Aim of LEP II was to study the triple interactions W+W−γ and W+W−Z0,
the latter being the salient aspect of the Yang-Mills interaction on which the unified
electroweak theory was based [Glashow 1961][Weinberg 1967][Salam 1968]. These in-
teractions are crucial for the consistency of the unified theory and had never been
seen before.
The production of W+W− pairs, at LEP, goes via two independent channels
(a) : e+e− → γ →W+W− and (b) : e+e− → Z0 →W+W−
The first is a purely electromagnetic process, already predicted in QED, while the
second is the genuine signal of the Yang-Mills nature of the electroweak interaction.
At LEP, the two amplitudes could be distinguished and studied separately from the
kinematic characteristics of the overall reaction.
L. B. At that time, which were the reasons to go for higher energies after LEP?
L. M. The studies I just mentioned did not exhaust the possible verifications of
the Standard Theory.
For one, besides the intermediate bosons, there was one crucial particle miss-
ing, the Brout-Englert-Higgs boson [Englert & Brout 1964][Higgs 1964] responsible
for the breaking of the electroweak symmetry, which is the source of the masses of
quarks, leptons and of the intermediate bosons. The search and the consequent study
3 HERA (Hadron-Electron Ring Accelerator) was built in a tunnel located under the
DESY site around 15 to 30 m underground with a circumference of 6.3 km. Inside this
tunnel, leptons and protons were stored in two independent storage rings on top of each
other. HERA began operating in 1992, with four large experiments: H1, ZEUS, HERMES
and HERA-B. Electrons or positrons were collided with protons at a centre of mass energy
of 318 GeV. It was the only lepton-proton collider in the world while operating. HERA was
closed down on 30 June 2007.
4 LEP was located in a tunnel at about 100 m underground, with a circumference of
around 27 km, located near CERN, in the region between the Geneva Airport and the
Jura mountain. Starting from January 2001, LEP has been dismantled and the same tunnel
adapted to host the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) and its four experiments, ALICE, ATLAS,
CMS, LHCb, also located underground.
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of the Higgs boson5 in the full range of masses indicated by theory was one of the
objectives — actually the most pressing one — of a high energy machine after LEP.
In addition, there was the possibility of entirely new particles at higher mass, for
which theoretical ideas were developed in the 1980s (see Box 1).
In the mid-1980s, the need of a higher energy collider seemed so pressing as to lead
Carlo Rubbia to suggest that perhaps one could dismiss LEP construction altogether
and jump directly to make a Large Hadron Collider in the LEP tunnel. The idea
met with a strong opposition in CERN and was fortunately dismissed by the CERN
Management.
Box 1. The quest for Higher Energy after LEP
The Standard Electroweak theory does not give a precise prediction of the Higgs
boson mass but it only leads to an estimate of an upper bound of about 800 GeV.
Such high masses were definitely not in the mass range accessible to LEP I and LEP
II, the latter being limited to reach a Higgs boson mass not much above 110 GeV.
The search of the Higgs boson in all its possible range of existence provided a first
strong motivation for higher energy. Another was the search for higher mass quarks,
such as the top quark.
An independent reason emerged in the early 1980s, when several theoretical papers
pointed out the possible existence of particles beyond the Standard Theory, that
could help to resolve the so-called hierarchy problem.
The essence of the problem is the extreme disparity of the mass scale of the Standard
Theory, of the order of 102 GeV as indicated by the W or the Higgs boson masses,
and the mass scale that would characterise a quantum theory of gravity, namely the
mass obtained by combining the Newton’s constant, GN , characterising the strength
of the gravitational interaction, with h¯ and c (Planck’s constant and the velocity
of light in vacuum). One finds the so-called Planck mass MP ∼ 1019 GeV, about
seventeen orders of magnitude larger than the electroweak mass scale.
It was argued that quantum corrections to the Higgs boson mass are so singular in
the Standard Theory as to bring its mass up to the Planck mass.
It was also observed that a new symmetry relating the scalar Higgs particle to spin
1/2 particles could suppress the quantum corrections so as to decouple the Higgs
boson mass from the Planck mass. Such a symmetry would imply the existence of
new particles in an estimated mass range of one to few TeV.a
A symmetry of this kind, called Supersymmetry had been mathematically charac-
terised at the beginning of the 1970s [Wess 1974] [Akulov & Volkov 1974] and recog-
nised to be an important step towards the unification of particle interactions, the
Standard Theory, with gravity.
A different solution to the hierarchy problem was advanced in the 1980s, namely
that, in analogy to the Cooper pairs in the theory of superconductivity, the Higgs
boson is not elementary, but is rather a composite particle made of a fermion-
antifermion pair, bound by new forces analogous to the colour forces that bind
the quarks in the hadrons, which have been given the name of Technicolor forces
[Weinberg 1975] [Susskind 1978].
The basic underlying theory would be based on elementary spinor and gauge fields
only and, in this case, the conventional symmetries present for these particles would
5 In his paper on electroweak unification, S. Weinberg noted the existence of this additional
particle quoting the Higgs paper and coined the definition of Higgs boson. The name has
remained in the jargon of particle physics and will be used here for brevity. The correct
attribution was recognised in the Nobel Prize 2012, attributed jointly to Francois Englert
and Peter Higgs (sadly, Robert Brout had passed away in 2011).
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be enough to suppress the quantum fluctuations without having to resort to Super-
symmetry. In this view, one finds again the prediction of numerous new particles in
the TeV range, the bound states of the new fermions that make up the Higgs boson,
called Techni-hadrons for brief.
In the same years, there was the confirmation by astronomical observations of the
existence of a large amount of non-luminous mass around the galaxies, the dark
mass, that could not be made by atoms or by other particles of the Standard Theory,
neutrinos included. The possibility that the lightest of the new particles required by
Supersymmetry could be the constituents of the dark matter and could possibly be
observed in high energy collisions added interest in the realisation of the LHC, and is
still considered today as an important motivation to step up in energy in the future,
should the LHC not find new particles in its energy range.
These considerations amply motivated the study of a proton-proton collider to be
installed in the LEP tunnel at the end of the electron-positron program. Given the
size of the tunnel and the technology conceivable at the time, the proton-proton
collider could reach a mass discovery potential of about 2 TeV and was named Large
Hadron Collider, LHC for brief. Hadron is the collective name given to the particles
affected by the strong nuclear interactions. Here it denotes the proton, to distinguish
this collider from the more familiar electron-positron colliders.
a 1 TeV=1000 GeV, about 1000 times the rest mass of a proton.
L. B. Before we move to the LHC, could you give a quick view on the LEP
results? Did LEP keep its promises?
L. M. Definitely yes. The LEP experiments produced a fantastic progress in our
confidence in the Standard Theory.
Of course, they have not been alone: experiments made with the Stanford Linear
Collider at SLAC, HERA at DESY, Tevatron at FermiLab have also given great
contributions. But, in my opinion, LEP results stand up for precision and for the
variety of phenomena that they have been able to address.
In extreme synthesis, four great LEP legacies are going to remain for long in our
textbooks:6
1. Precision test of asymptotic freedom, with the determination of the behaviour of
αstrong up to 200 GeV. This result originated from the study of the hadronic
jets coming out of the decay of the Z0, which allowed to study gluon emission
at considerably large value of the momentum transfer, which are controlled by
αstrong and by the theoretical characteristics of the colour group. LEP tested QCD
in the region of large time-like momenta. In the same years, the study of scaling
violations at HERA produced values of αstrong at large space-like momenta. The
agreement between the two classes of experiments is theoretically very significant.
2. Three light neutrinos, from the Z0 width. We can measure the total Z0 width,
from the line-shape of the resonance, and individual widths, from the peak of the
cross-section for each visible channel. Subtracting the visible from the total width
one obtains the width in the invisible channels (i.e. particles that do not interact
in the detectors). Assuming invisible particles to be neutrinos and dividing by the
decay width into one pair of neutrinos of a given type, provided by the Standard
Model, one obtains the number of light, left-handed neutrinos in which Z0 may
decay. The number obtained is very close to three, confirming the Standard Model
6 For a more exhaustive account of the LEP results see [Treille 2002].
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Fig. 1: The Blueband Plot shows the constraints on the Higgs mass from precision mea-
surements. The best fit and the width of the parabola vary, mostly due to shifts in the top
mass and its uncertainty. In yellow, on the left, the region excluded by LEP experiments
[LEP EWG 2005].
picture of three quark and lepton generations. This number provides today an im-
portant term of comparison with Cosmological observations, which are sensitive
to the gravitational effects of heavy or sterile (i.e. not coupled to weak interac-
tions) neutrinos which would not appear in Z0 decay. At the moment, there is no
discrepancy with three neutrino types, in the Laboratory or in the Sky.
3. The e+e− →WW cross section, that definitely proved the existence of theWWZ
vertex, required by Yang and Mills. The predicted cross-section for W pair pro-
duction in the old Intermediate Vector Boson Theory, no unification and no Yang-
Mills, has a quite more divergent behaviour with energy, than observed. The
confirmation of electroweak unification with the Yang-Mills interaction is quite
spectacular.
4. Electroweak couplings and masses of quarks, leptons and intermediate bosons. LEP
I and LEP II produced many electroweak observables to be compared with higher
order electroweak predictions. With the top quark discovered, in 1994, and the
precision attained at LEP, one could afford to make an overall fit to the electroweak
observables, with the Higgs boson mass, mH , the only unknown variable. This led
to the famous “Blueband Plot” (Fig. 1). Including results from all facilities,7
the plot presents the χ2 of the fit versus the Higgs boson mass. It gave, at the
beginning of 2000s, a very significant indication of a light Higgs boson, with the
upper bound: mH ≤ 200 GeV to 90% confidence level.
7 There still remains some tension between SLC and LEP concerning the asymmetry of b
quark in Z0 decay, see [LEP EWG 2005].
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The consistency of the experimental results with the predictions of the theory was
decisive for our confidence in the theory, and added interest to going at higher energy
to see whether the Standard Theory had to be merged into an even more successful
theory. Meanwhile, the search of the Higgs boson, within the LEP II mass boundaries,
became the first objective of the experimental collaborations.
2 The LHC Era Begins
L. B. Back to the story of LHC. You mentioned Rubbia’s idea of dismissing LEP
in favour of a proton collider. How was it related with discussions about the choice
electron-positron vs. proton-proton machines?
L. M. Already before LEP was built, there was the idea of replacing LEP with
a proton-proton collider in the tunnel.
The discussion started when the width of the LEP tunnel had to be determined.
Most Northern countries, in particular UK, wanted a tunnel diameter as small as
possible, not to jeopardise LEP approval. My suspicion is that these countries also
thought that LEP had to be the last CERN machine. But there was another party
which argued that making a larger tunnel would make it possible, in a second time,
to install a proton collider, a machine with superconducting magnets appropriate to
go to higher energy. The tunnel diameter was fundamental, because you need very
intense magnetic fields to go to high energy, requiring extra space to install such
magnets. And at the end there was a real confrontation in the LEP working group
chaired by Nino Zichichi.
The group had an advisory role on the project made by CERN itself — which was
called the pink book. And they finally made a special recommendation to make the
tunnel as large as possible in order to build later a superconducting proton machine.
A compromise was reached, which at the beginning looked very strange: to make the
tunnel large enough to contain one proton superconducting ring, but not two.
Unlike electron-positron, proton-proton colliders, in the most direct realisation,
require two rings, because the charges of the colliding beams are the same, and there-
fore that seemed a contradictory measure. But it was accepted: it was better than
nothing. In any case, the tunnel was made much larger than needed for LEP and that
stimulated CERN to think about the possibility of installing two proton beams in the
same ring, what was called the two-in-one scheme. Two-in-one was not obvious since
it required a magnetic field modulated so that it went one way in the position of one
beam and the other way in the position of the other.
A two-in-one model was first designed by Giorgio Brianti in 1985 and presented at
the Moriond School. This may be considered to be the birth of the LHC [Brianti 1985].
The design presented by Brianti had all the essentials of the LHC as realised later.
The design was revised by Lyn Evans who made changes, ameliorations, changing the
length of the magnets, but the essential ideas of Brianti’s design have remained.
3 Colliders in competition
Then came the Aachen meeting, in 1990, a workshop gathering some 500 physicists to
put the research case for the proposed LHC. George Kalmus, in his closing remarks,
declared: “It (the Aachen meeting) has marked a watershed, the time, when the LHC
project . . . graduated . . . to being the way forward for European particle physics.”
In 1992, Council declared that the LHC “will be CERN’s next facility.” In the
Evian meeting, same year, Expressions of Interest for experiments were presented and
the LHC Experiments Committee was created at CERN.
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Fig. 2: First pages of the Proceedings of the LHC workshops held in Lausanne, 1984
[ECFA-CERN 1984], and Aachen, 1990 [Jarlskog & Rein 1990]. Note the early design of the
machine layout in the LEP tunnel, with the LHC and the LEP rings together. Coexistence
of the two machines was considered up to 1995, when it was dismissed by Chris Llewellyn
Smith at the Lepton-Photon Conference in Beijing.
My direct interest started in 1993 when, while President of INFN, I was nominated
in the Italian delegation to the CERN Council and we started discussing how to
proceed to secure the future of High Energy Physics in Europe.
At the time, the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC) was being built in the US,
in a new, very large tunnel which allowed to reach an energy quite higher than the
LHC. There was a debate in Europe whether simply to drop CERN plans and join
the Americans, or otherwise continue with the LHC project.
Somewhat before, Herwig Schopper, as CERN’s director, had made part of a
delegation to the US, to discuss a possible European participation in the SSC. In his
book Schopper reports of a meeting in Washington where they were told that Europe
should contribute between 100 and 200 million dollars [Schopper 2009]. But they were
also told that the project was there and they simply had to send the money. At these
conditions, Schopper recalls, they could not accept, and the discussion was dropped
there. It was a wise decision because in this way Europe did not commit itself to the
complicated story of the SSC, which was totally out of our control since all decisions
were made in the Senate of the United States. We avoided the fate of the Japanese,
who committed themselves to the SSC and then learned from newspapers that it had
been cancelled (late 1993).
Before that, there had been an important development due to Carlo Rubbia. He
made a working group, with Sam Ting and others, to study the effect of luminosity
on the discovery potential of an hadron collider. SSC was planned to have an energy
of about 40 TeV, almost 3 times what LHC could reach, but designed to work at the
typical luminosity of proton colliders, something like 1032cm−2s−1. Carlo proposed
what was called, a little emphatically, the energy vs. luminosity trade.
Will be inserted by the editor 9
In an hadron collider, protons have enormous energy (20 TeV in SSC, 7 TeV in
LHC) but you see the collisions of the most numerous partons, which have energies
much lower that proton’s energy. This makes, roughly speaking, a reduction factor
of about 1/4 of the discovery potential with respect to the beam energy (assuming
new particles are produced in pair). Thus a proton machine such as the SSC would
discover new particles up to something like 5 TeV.
If you make a machine with larger luminosity — they were thinking of 2 orders
of magnitude — and you run it for, let’s say, one year, you have a certain number of
collisions, and among them there are also collisions of the partons which are more en-
ergetic than the average and therefore produce particles of higher mass than expected
from the previous estimate. With a lower luminosity these collisions would not have
sufficient statistics to be analysed.
The result was that increasing the luminosity of the LHC by 2 orders magnitude,
one could get to a potential for the discovery of new particles with mass of 2.5–3 TeV,
which started being competitive with the SSC. The energy vs. luminosity trade was
used as an argument to convince the Europeans that it was still sensible to go for the
LHC, given the obvious advantage of being a cheaper machine and easier to be done
because the tunnel infrastructure and the laboratory around it did already exist.
In contrast, the SSC was planned to be an entirely new infrastructure, to be built
in Texas from the green field, together with an entirely new laboratory. I think that
it was in fact the big mistake of DOE not to make the SSC at FermiLab, but that is
another story.
The energy vs. luminosity trade argument was not entirely convincing. The SSC
could have increased its luminosity in a second time, while the LHC could not easily
increase its energy, but it kept most of European physicists behind the LHC, until
finally the SSC was cancelled [Riordan 2000].
L. B. What was the reaction at the news that the Congress had cancelled the
SSC project in late 1993?
L. M. Well, CERN was ready to face the shock. However, it was a big shock.
The argument made by several countries was: If the Americans gave up why do
we have to spend money to do this? So there was a big confrontation in the countries.
Rubbia did not succeed in getting LHC approved by the CERN Council and the
matter was left to the new Director General, Chris Llewellyn Smith. Chris took the
approval of LHC as his main task.
First, he appointed Lyn Evans as responsible of the machine, after Brianti retired,
a really excellent move. Then they started a large R&D effort on the superconducting
magnets, which were the real issue.
The other issue was the R&D on detectors, to make them able to stand a luminos-
ity never tried before of 1034cm−2s−1. At CERN, Rubbia had made a committee to
survey the issue, the LHC experiment committee, in which I have been in 1992-1993.
Detector research was located essentially in CERN Member States, in Italy at INFN,
and that created a large momentum in support of LHC approval.
L. B. The high energy and luminosity essential for the physics goals of LHC gave
rise to new formidable experimental challenges. . . In 1992, letters of intent to build
the multipurpose detectors ATLAS and the Compact Muon Solenoid (CMS) were
submitted,8 and in 1993 the ALICE Collaboration proposed to build a dedicated
8 ATLAS Collaboration, “ATLAS. Letter of Intent for a General-Purpose pp Experiment
at the Large Hadron Collider at CERN” (CERN/LHCC/92-4, LHCC/I2, 1 October 1992);
CMS Collaboration, “The Compact Muon Solenoid. Letter of intent for a General Purpose
Detector at the LHC” (CERN-LHCC-92-3, LHCC/I-1, 1 October 1992).
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heavy-ion detector, expecting the formation of a new phase of matter, the quark-
gluon plasma.9 Technical proposals followed in 1994, when LHC was approved.
The search for the Higgs boson of course influenced the design of the ATLAS
and CMS experiments. Which new physics scenarios were expected to be explored at
LHC?
L. M. The first requisite for the general purpose detectors, ATLAS and CMS,
was of course to be able to discover the Higgs boson up to 800 GeV, the upper
bound indicated by the Standard Theory and also by possible variations such as the
composite Higgs models (see Box 1). The signature of choice was identified in the
decay H → γγ and that led to the special requirement of detectors with a very high
resolution in energy, to resolve a photon-photon line in a very large background of
photons from pi0 decays. To this aim, ATLAS developed very sophisticated liquid
argon detectors, CMS an advanced generation of scintillating crystals. In addition,
there was the exploration of the high energy side, hunting for the hypothetical new
particles. The key here was to develop very hermetic detectors, which could measure
with great accuracy total energy and total momentum of the particles produced in
the collision. It was in fact estimated that a fraction of the new particles would
decay in particles that would not interact in the detector, neutrinos or even the
hypothetical dark matter particles. An anomalous signal of “missing energy” and
“missing momentum” in the final states would be a clear signal of new physics.
The other detectors, LHCb and ALICE had more specific objectives. For LHCb:
advanced resolution in energy and in the location of the vertex (to detect events
in which weakly decaying particles were produced, such as particles containing b
or c quarks). For ALICE: the capacity to deal with events with exceptionally large
multiplicity of final particles, such as those expected in heavy ion collisions.
4 Superconductivity in Italy
L. B. LHC would use existing CERN infrastructure: the LEP tunnel and the acceler-
ator complex as an injector, which brought about a dramatic cost saving compared to
creating a totally new facility. However, to reach the desired ultra-high beam energies,
a very significant effort had to be undertaken to develop the large superconducting
magnets. At that time, there was a program of cooperation between Italy and CERN
on such an enterprise. . .
L. M. Interest in Italy on superconducting magnets had started with the machine
HERA, at DESY, when Italy decided to contribute not in cash, but providing a
number of superconducting dipoles. It was an idea of Nino Zichichi, devised to prepare
the Italian industry for the accelerators of the future and it was a very good intuition.
The Italian companies interested were Ansaldo Magneti, Zanon for cryogenics,
and Europa Metalli (a company owned by the Orlando family and later sold to the
Outokumpu group in Finland) for superconducting cables. These companies had pro-
vided the HERA magnets in time. That was an encouraging success for Nino, who
was thinking about the construction, in Italy, of a really big machine, Eloisatron
(Eurasiatic Long Intersecting Storage Accelerator), a proton-proton collider of 100
TeV per beam [Zichichi 1990]. So he wanted to have the Italian industry to start into
that business.
Nicola Cabibbo became INFN President after Nino and continued to promote
superconductivity.
9 ALICE Collaboration, “Letter of Intent for A Large Ion Collider Experiment at the
CERN Large Hadron Collider” (CERN/LHCC/93-16, LHCC/I4, 1 March 1993).
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A superconductive cyclotron was planned in Milano. At the time there was a
very brilliant accelerator physicist in Milano, Francesco Resmini. INFN gave him the
leadership for the construction of the “Ciclotrone Superconduttore”, that was com-
pleted by his collaborators after the untimely Resmini’s death. The superconducting
cyclotron was then transferred to Catania, where it is still working.
After Resmini, the development of superconductivity was led by Lucio Rossi in
LASA (Laboratorio di Superconduttivita` Applicata, in Milano) and that laboratory
took over the collaboration with CERN on the LHC superconducting magnets.
When I became President, succeeding Nicola, I strongly supported that collabo-
ration, and extended the aim of the superconductivity program in Italy to include
the LHC detectors, for which superconductivity was becoming a central issue.
We got extra money from the Ministry of Research to support R&D on detectors
in a joint, INFN-Industry collaboration. It was called the 2% project, because it was
based on money taken by the Ministry from the research Institutions in Italy, in the
measure of 2% of their funds, to be given to projects in collaboration with industry.
The project with industry allowed us to recuperate money taken out of the INFN
budget and put them to use for the future LHC experiments.
The know-how thus acquired enabled later Ansaldo to win the contract for the
cryogenics of CMS and LASA could participate in the making of one of the super-
conducting rings of ATLAS, in competition with Orsay.
5 The Approval of LHC
L. B. When were the first superconducting magnets completed?
L. M. The first 11 meters long magnet, made in collaboration between CERN,
INFN and Ansaldo, was presented at CERN at the end of 1994. The magnet arrived
just before Council and it made a rather spectacular impact. At the Council, Llewellyn
Smith submitted again the proposal to approve LHC construction.
At that point it was clear that Germany was resisting. In part, I guess, because
Bjo¨rn Wick, then DESY director, did not believe that the two-in-one magnets would
work. For this reason, the prototype was important, because it proved the two-in-one
to be a viable concept. There were still questions about the optics, about joining one
magnet to the other, but these were mechanical problems and the general idea was
that they could be overcome.
However, there was still a problem of money, and many countries in the Council
did not want to invest so much in the LHC.
It was at this point the Chris and Lyn invented a way out which was called
the “missing magnet proposal”. The proposal was to approve as baseline a reduced
project, which would contain only two thirds of the magnets and of course would cost
less. In addition, Council would give two years to the Management to find external
contributions to fund the missing magnets and be able to submit to Council the full
project.
It was a brilliant move, which succeeded in removing the residual doubts. Many
people thought that the missing magnet project could not be realised, because of the
complicated cryogenic structure, so finding the extra money was really vital.
But Chris accepted the risk and, in December 1994, the “reduced” LHC was
approved.
L. B. What was your personal opinion about all this?
L. M. I was very happy for the physics. The approval of LHC meant we could
continue doing first class particle physics for a couple of decades, at least. Even though
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I felt, as many others, that the missing magnet solution could not stand and it was
only a temporary solution. But I was happy also because we could go on with an
important program in superconductivity to which I had already committed INFN.
Chris and Lorenzo Foa` — who was at the time CERN’s Director of Research —
started a campaign to build consensus around the LHC. They opened discussions with
many countries, in particular Japan, United States, Russia and India, and obtained
a lot of support. The Japanese finally agreed to provide 300 million Swiss Francs, in
money, suggesting that this money could be spent in Japan. As a consequence, Japan
got orders for part of the superconducting cable.
At the time, a very influential study appeared in the US by a committee led
by Sydney Drell. They observed that the plan of US financing for Particle Physics
still contained a bump corresponding to the SSC expenses. The recommendation was
to use this bump to finance a strong American participation in the LHC. For the
American contribution to the machine, they could put to work the infrastructures
made in Fermilab to build the superconducting magnets of SSC. Eventually, the US
agreed to produce the LHC quadrupoles and other items, for a value of about 200
Million USD, a very important contribution, and the “Drell bump”, as it was called,
was also used to finance the US participation to CMS and ATLAS. The total agreed
contribution was of 500 Million USD.
This was happening in 1994-1995. Then, in summer 1996 there was a new crisis
of the cost.
Germany stated that, due to their difficulties with reunification, they wanted to
reduce their contribution to all research initiatives. In the case of CERN, the cut
envisaged was 8.5% for the first two years and 9.3% for the following years (as men-
tioned in [Llewellyn Smith 2015], see also [Schunck 2016]). UK joined in, requiring
a reduction in the LHC cost, and other countries, including Italy, stated that a re-
duction could only be general, for all Member States, and not allowed to Germany
alone.
There was a very complex discussion, between summer and the December Council,
with the proposal of an overall cut to CERN’s annual budget. On the whole, inte-
grating over the years of LHC construction, the cut corresponded to about 600-700
million Swiss Francs.
Chris, at the end, accepted the cut, stating that it could be compensated by future
savings from the laboratory. But there were energetic protests from the part of the
CERN staff against Management, accused to have yielded to Council at the expenses
of CERN’s scientific future (see e.g. [Maiani & Bassoli 2013]).
The Americans also were unhappy. In the CERN-US discussions it had been ex-
plicitly stated that the extra money given by the US would be used to improve the
project and not for Member States to save on their contribution to CERN.
Finally, at the end of 1996, Council approved (i) to proceed with the construction
of the full LHC (which was good) but also (ii) to cut CERN budget (not so good).
Everybody was happy and, essentially, everybody immediately forgot about the cut:
somebody was to take care of it later.
In the same Council of December 1996, I was nominated President of the Council,
to succeed the French scientist Hubert Courien. Courien had played a crucial role
in the negotiations of the LHC with Germany and the other Member States, with
vision, wisdom, political skill and determination.
6 On Board
In 1997, the succession to Llewellyn Smith was opened. At mid year it appeared that
I could be a suitable candidate. Chris told me: it’s either me or you. I suspended my
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Fig. 3: Signature of the agreement between CERN and the United States for participation
to the LHC project. From left: Neil Lane, president of NSF, Federico Pen˜a, Secretary of
State, Luciano Maiani, President of CERN Council, Chris Llewellyn Smith, CERN Director
General, Washington, December 8, 1997 (Photo CERN).
function of President of Council, and I was proposed by the Committee of Council in
September.
However, formally, I was still President of CERN Council in November ’97, and I
went to Washington with Chris to sign the agreement with the US. The agreements
with Japan and Russia had been already finalised, by Hubert Curien. The signature of
the US agreement was my last act as Council’s President and I was voted as Director
General elect in December 1997, to take the direction of CERN one year later, starting
from January 1, 1999.
LHC construction, started in 1997, was now on my shoulders.
At that time, it really seemed that LHC would go by itself. Lyn Evans was a
well established project leader, as Picasso had been for LEP, there was a full team
established, and the construction was going.
In ’99, with the LHC we encountered only normal difficulties. One example arose
in the excavation of the CMS shaft. CMS is very close to the Jura (much closer than
ATLAS) and there is a real river flowing underground there, which made it impossible
to excavate the shaft that had to bring the CMS detector to the cavern below.
The solution was to inject liquid nitrogen in the ground, making a sort of per-
mafrost in which it was possible to excavate, to return to normal conditions later,
after the walls of the shaft had been consolidated. It was a brilliant solution, but it
did cost a considerable amount of time and of, not foreseen, money.
At that time, enough magnets had been produced to make a section of LHC — a
string of magnets 120 meters long — which was installed in the laboratory to test the
behaviour of the magnets, for example their quenching characteristics. The results of
the tests were very positive, very informative and very encouraging.
So, I was taken by another story.
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Fig. 4: Seminar in honour of Carlo Rubbia on the occasion of his 65th birthday, 16 March
1999. Left to right: Gerard ’t Hooft, Georges Charpak, Alan Astbury, Luciano Maiani, Klaus
Winter, Carlo Rubbia, Arthur Kerman and Val Fitch (Photo CERN).
By 1998 neutrino oscillations of atmospheric muon neutrinos had been officially
anounced [Kajita 1998] [Fukuda et al. 1998]. However, only the disappearance of neu-
trinos had been proved. It was thought that νµ would oscillate into ντ but the low
energy of atmospheric neutrinos did not allow to produce the τ in their subsequent
interaction and to identify positively the νµ−ντ oscillation. CERN could make a neu-
trino beam of sufficient energy, to be sent to the Gran Sasso laboratory in Italy, some
700 km south of Geneva. There, neutrinos would interact with a suitable detector,
to be revealed as ντ [Elsener 1998]. An Italy–Japan collaboration proposed to do so,
with an ad hoc detector based on nuclear emulsions, later realised under the name of
OPERA, led by Kimio Niwa and Paolo Strolin [Ereditato et al. 1998].
In 1997, I had already expressed to Council my intention to realise a “long-baseline
neutrino beam”, going from CERN to Gran Sasso. Not everybody was happy but,
after some discussion, the CNGS project (CERN Neutrinos to Gran Sasso) went
through, with the external contributions from France, Germany and Belgium and
the important support of INFN, which funded the decay tunnel at CERN and the
preparation of the areas in the Gran Sasso underground laboratories to receive the
neutrinos.
L. B. At CERN the CHORUS experiment [Eskut et al. 1997], using the neutrino
beam of the SPS accelerator, had completed data taking in 1998. What was the
interest of performing such a new attempt if compared with other parallel efforts
searching for a conclusive evidence of the oscillation mechanism at the atmospheric
and solar scale? And especially in the context of the new generation of long baseline
experiments designed to search for a direct evidence of νµ − ντ oscillations?
L. M. Neutrino experiments at CERN and other laboratories had searched with-
out success for the disappearance of muon neutrinos, but the parameters of this kind
of oscillations derived later from the atmospheric neutrinos indicated that the oscil-
lation length needed to reveal the effect was much longer and could only be obtained
with a long baseline beam, like CNGS. At that time the only existing experiment
of this kind was the K2K (the neutrino beam starting from the laboratory KEK lo-
cated in Tsukuba, Japan, to reach the underground Kamioka Observatory, located in
Kamioka, about 250 km away) which, however, had not the energy to produce the τs
and therefore to prove positively the existence of νµ − ντ oscillations. CERN had the
right energy and Gran Sasso was at about the right distance.
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Fig. 5: At the Budker Institute, Novosibirsk, to survey the production of Russian magnets,
with Lyn Evans (left) and Sasha Skrinsky (right), in 2000. The warm magnets produced
at Novosibirsk made part of the Russian contribution to the LHC and have been installed
in the tunnels to transfer the proton beams from the SPS to the LHC ring. Photo by A.
Skrinsky.
7 The End of LEP
L. B. In the meantime, what was happening with the tunnelling works for LHC?
L. M. In 2000, the excavation was getting near the LEP tunnel and at the end
of 2000 LEP had to be discontinued.
The original program was to shut down LEP at the end of 1999. But since exca-
vation of LHC tunnels was late, Chris proposed to Council an extension to the full
year 2000, which was approved just before Chris left, at the end of 1998.
So, at the end of 1999 LEP entered into its last year. We were of course monitoring
the results and around summer the ALEPH experiment collected some anomalous
events that could indicate production of the Higgs boson, just at the upper end of
the machine energy range.
ALEPH reported three anomalous events with four jets in the final state. In the
three events, two jets had originated from a b quark (or antiquark) as indicated by
the fact that the jets initiated at a distance from the point of the primary collision,
i.e. had originated from a weakly decaying particle compatible with a b mesons. The
other two jets were compatible with the decay of a Z0. The total mass of the b jets
clustered at the end of the phase space around M = 114 GeV. In all, the events
looked like:
e+e− → Z0 +H (1)
followed by:
Z0 → 2 jets; H → bb¯ (2)
Of course, these events had a background of similar events produced by interac-
tions not involving the Higgs boson, the distinction could be only statistical. At the
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end of summer, the significance of the three events to originate from the Higgs boson
was estimated by ALEPH to be 2.2 σ (standard deviations) the conventional limit
for discovery being 5 σ. The other experiments did not have anything so spectacular
and reported only slight excesses of events over the no-Higgs expectation.
Roger Cashmore, was following them closely, and I was continuously in touch with
him during summer. At the end of summer, the experimental collaborations, led by
ALEPH, asked to continue for another year, to clarify the situation.
Now that was a very big problem, because the time plan in the contracts of the
LHC civil works established that excavations had to break into the LEP tunnel at
the beginning of 2001. To give LEP the prolongation of one year, we should tell
the companies to stop for one year, but nonetheless continue to pay them all the
same. Pending a more complete discussion, we prolonged LEP running, due to stop
in September, to the end of October.
In fall 2000 there was a big celebration for the end of LEP running with authorities
from Member States invited. There was happiness, but also apprehension about the
pending closure of LEP. Steve Meyers, a little dramatically, called his talk the “LEP
wake”.
At that time, in view of the continuing expectation for new anomalous events, I
asked discretely the LHC team to make a study about how much we should have to
spend, in case of one year prolongation. The answer was an extra cost of about 120
MCHF.
Finally we arrived at the beginning of November which was the time when we
should take the decision. In this discussion, I was in touch with Roger and with
Michel Spiro, the Chair of the LEP experiments Committee.
L. B. What did you think of the intriguing observation reported by the ALEPH
experiment?
L. M. Well, we were not really convinced. But then, just at the end of Oc-
tober/beginning of November L3 recorded an event, which looked like something
decaying to bb¯ and produced in association with missing energy which could be a Z0
going into 2 neutrinos.
The picture was: you produce the Higgs and the Z0, the Higgs goes into bb¯ materi-
alising into hadron jets and the Z0 into ν− ν¯. The mass of the Higgs boson candidate
was estimated at 114 GeV, similar to what had been found in the ALEPH events.
I was very much impressed and, at first sight, I thought that this event could
change the entire world. But then, looking at it closer — and Michel and Roger
had an important say — we realised that there were other ways but neutrinos from
a Z0, in which energy could be lost, which made the presence of a Z0 not so clear.
Neutrinos mean that energy is missing, but energy could be missing for other reasons:
radiation going down the LEP pipes, or neutrinos from b decays. Discovering Z → νν¯
had been possible at the Spp¯S because both energy and momentum were missing.
But the neutrino momentum, in L3, was related to the momentum of the Z0, which
essentially vanished because this event was at the top of LEP energy. No missing
momentum was there to be seen and that meant that you would not be able to tell
whether the missing energy was neutrinos or had some other explanation.
When the L3 event was presented in CERN — by the physics coordinator, Si-
monetta Gentile, with Ting in the audience — I had prepared one transparency to
illustrate my point.
“I am very sorry, I said, your interpretation may well be right, but the evidence
is not conclusive. This is not a golden event with neutrinos, because of the lack of
missing momentum. It would be different if you could increase LEP energy by say 30
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Fig. 6: Mr. Bill Richardson, State Secretary of Energy of USA (center) behind the cryostat
for a prototype superconducting quadrupole magnet built by the US-LHC collaboration
(hence the FermiLab logo) as part of the US contribution. Left to right: Mildred Dresselhaus,
Carlo Wyss, Luciano Maiani, Roger Cashmore, Amb. George Moose, Peter Rosen (from the
US Delegation at CERN Council), John Ellis. CERN, 16 September 2000 (Photo CERN).
GeV. In that case you would produce the Higgs and the Z0 with some momentum and
neutrinos could be identified by missing momentum in addition to missing energy.
In the present conditions, neutrinos can be identified only statistically, but in
one year of running you will not be able to go from a suggestion to discovery. The
significance of the event as Higgs production was slightly below 3σ, but to attain 5σ,
the discovery limit, would require running for four to five years, or something like
that.”
So I concluded: “I am sorry but we cannot afford to go on.”
The committees that had to recommend the extension were not able to arrive to
a decision. They had mixed opinions, some people were rightly afraid that a LEP
prolongation might badly damage the LHC. Finally, the issue arrived at the level of
the Director General and we had to take ourselves the decision. We made a directorate,
we discussed around the table and arrived at the conclusion that it was not wise to
put our money in such a risky enterprise as stopping LHC for one year.
We left one door open: if Council would give us 120 million Swiss Francs to do
that, we would take the risk. But Council said no, you have to find the money yourself.
Then I called for November 17 a special restricted Council Meeting (what was called
the “Committee of Council”) to prepare the decision for the December Council. The
final CC statement read:
On 17th November 2000, the CERN Committee of Council held a meeting to
examine a proposal by the Director-General concerning the continuation of the existing
CERN programme, which foresees the decommissioning of the LEP accelerator at the
end of the year 2000. The Committee has expressed its recognition and gratitude for
the outstanding work done by the LEP accelerator and experimental teams. It has
taken note of the request by many members of the CERN Scientific Community to
continue LEP running into 2001 and also noted the divided views expressed in the
Scientific Committees consulted on this subject. On the basis of these considerations
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and in the absence of a consensus to change the existing programme, the Committee
of Council supports the Director-General in pursuing the existing CERN programme.
L. B. One can imagine that all this developed a lot of controversies about that
decision. . .
L. M. Yes! And for different reasons. The most obvious one was that there was
a whole community of people that really saw in LEP the last possibility to get the
result of their life, I mean, for example, people that were going to retire and could
not see a future in the LHC. Also, many people really believed that the anomalous
events were the signal of a Higgs boson with mass 114 GeV and that in one year they
could get to a discovery.
Fig. 7: Getting into the LEP tunnel from the SPS with Lyn Evans (right), May 15, 2001
(Photo CERN).
On the other side, LHC was still in an uncertain future. While the work of ex-
cavation was going forward, the preparation of the detectors was delayed. So, some
people in the experimental collaborations thought that after all, waiting for one more
year could not be a bad idea.
I was accused, by still another party, to have made a deal with the Americans
selling them the Higgs boson. By stopping LEP, we were giving Tevatron a chance
to discover the Higgs, in exchange of their support to continue with LHC. However,
in the same meeting where we took the decision, Lyn Evans had made absolutely
clear that Tevatron could not put LHC in danger, because of its too low luminosity.
Indeed, LHC had suffered a delay of four years on the schedule we fixed in 2001, and
still Fermilab could not see a competitive signal of the Higgs boson. Lyn’s was a fairly
accurate assessment.
So there was a lot of opposition, but we stood firmly by our decision. Very impor-
tant was the support of Roger, Michel Spiro and Lyn Evans.
I presented the case in December and Council formally approved.
But, even after Council, there were rumours that, after all, LEP could start again.
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What made me jump was to learn, in the directorate of January, that the main
power lines arriving to LEP had not been cut. So, I put in the minutes that if that
line was still there in one week, I would go down in the tunnel and cut it myself.
The line was cut and in May 2001 the excavation of the tunnel connecting SPS to
LHC broke into the LEP tunnel (Fig. 7).
In spring, a more advanced analysis of the LEP events was presented. DELPHI and
OPAL had not found any significant event. the analysis showed that the anomalous
effect, combining the result of all collaborations, was of 2.3 σ (final results are reported
in [Barate et al. 2003]). It confirmed that, even if real, one year of more running could
not possibly take the signal out of background. In fact, the most likely interpretation
of the L3 event was that the two b’s had decayed semileptonically, with neutrinos
taking out a lot of energy and almost no momentum.
Even after LHC went into operation, there were still people who believed that
the Higgs boson was there in the LEP events. In 2011, during the celebration of my
70th birthday, a slide of Carlo Dionisi (Fig. 8), showed my desk and below the desk
a suitcase ready to leave for exotic destinations . . . just in case the Higgs boson were
discovered at LHC, with a mass confirming the LEP events.
Fig. 8: A slide presented by Carlo Dionisi at the Workshop for my seventieth anniversary,
November 2011.
Another post-LEP complaint was that Chris Llewellyn Smith had been offered
by Ansaldo to buy an extra lot of superconducting cavities that could increase LEP
energy by about 30 GeV. He had not accepted the offer for lack of funds. After that,
Ansaldo dismounted the assembly line of the cavities and this possibility was not
there at my time. Schopper, in his book quoted before [Schopper 2009], criticises the
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choice attributing to the previous Director the fact that LEP had to be prematurely
closed. The issue was raised again in a meeting of the Scientific Policy Committee
that took place in 2012 with the participation of former members (the old boys).
Chris was present and recalled that at the time he had not the money and that it was
totally out of the question to ask Council to increase the CERN’s budget for that.
So, he concluded, I could not obtain the money and I did not have the money, and
that was it.
I must say here that I agree with Chris. If you have a program approved for a new
machine, LHC, with an enormous financial effort, you cannot press Council because
you want to spend an additional 15 million Swiss Francs to potentiate a machine
arrived at the end of its energy, LEP, just to have another ambitious little territory.
It would have been different if CERN did not have any other plan. But CERN
was committing itself to the LHC, the only machine capable to sweep in one year the
whole Higgs boson region, which is what LHC did in the years 2011-2012.
In my report to Council in December 2000, about the decision to close LEP, I
concluded:
This decision moves us definitely into the LHC era. A powerful complex of machine
and detectors, to fully explore the Higgs and SUSY region. Le Roi est mort. Vive le
Roi!!
How much we needed to focus all efforts at CERN on the new objective became
clear nine months later, in fall 2001.
8 Cost Crisis
L. B. Well, this brings us to September 2001 and the disclosure of the cost increase
of the LHC. . .
L. M. In 1999, we had made an exploratory call for tender for a first lot of
superconducting magnets and the reply was very bad, I remember a cost about twice
what had been planned. Lyn advised not to take the offer. He thought the companies
were charging us for the risks of construction, still poorly known. With more R&D on
cold mass assembly and more prototyping, companies would be more confident and
would lower the cost. We did so, putting more R&D resources into the magnets.
In spring 2001 we went to the call for tender for the full lot of magnets. Offers
came to CERN during summer. While in vacation with my wife (in Ischia) I remember
being in touch almost every day with Lyn Evans, to monitor the situation. We got a
cost considerably less than what we had gotten in 1999, but still a good 30% more
than expected. This time we had to accept.
So, when I came back in September, I asked to make an overall estimate of the
total cost the LHC. I thought it was time to have not only the cost of the machine,
but also to make an overall recognition of what would be the cost of everything was
needed. The need of much larger computing power was already coming out, estimated
at 150 MCHF and also the increase in CERN contribution to detector construction
(50 MCHF). And there were the costs of installation, the upgrade of the injector
system, waste disposal, etc. In short, all what was needed to refurbish and upgrade
CERN infrastructures, to host and run the LHC.
These items had not been really ever costed, they had gone always under the
entry: general laboratory expenses. I wanted to put everything together and find out
what really was the “cost-to-completion” of the LHC and see how it would fit in the
Laboratory budget of the coming years.
Will be inserted by the editor 21
We went through a very deep examination. There were joint meetings of the groups
that were building the LHC, each of them reporting what had been spent and what
they needed to complete their task. I was there all the time, carefully listening.
Because in fact there was criticism. The previous attitude, when the cost had to
be given at the time of approval, was to make what could be called “planning for
success”. If you tell me you need to spend 100, I tell you that you have to get to 80
and put 80 on my list. And, of course, to get to 80 becomes your problem.
I remember I was trying to do that again, but there was no way. This time, people
did not want to sign for 80. So I got convinced that the extra cost was there.
Besides the LHC machine and the new civil construction cost (the caverns for
the experiments), there were all the other issues I just mentioned, never considered
before. It came also out that Lyn Evans, with Chris authorisation, had spent 120
million in prototyping that had been added to the LHC cost, while, according to the
plan made at the time, prototyping should have been charged to the Laboratory, to
be reabsorbed within 2009 (another 20 Millions that I had authorised in 1999, at the
time of the first call for tender of the magnets, had taken the same destination). I
was rather upset. “You could have told me before — was my comment — fortunately
they have been well spent . . . ”.
So we put everything together. There was about 480 MCHF increase in the cost of
the machine, corresponding to 18% increase over planned cost, and the total increase
was estimated at 850 MCHF.
To give the full picture, we thought it useful to add also expenses which we deemed
necessary in the future, such as R&D for a future linear collider or for the LHC
upgrade, which brought the total above one billion Francs.
I wrapped up everything in two slides (Fig. 9), and called for a special session of
the Finance Committee, on September 19, to tell them our findings.
Fig. 9: Items in the first page, adding to 850 MCHF, are the extra cost to completion of the
full LHC project, including additional infrastructures, computing and detector expenses, as
reported to the Finance Committee of September 19, 2001. Items in the second page provide
estimate of future expenses.
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In the Finance Committee, the 1 billion figure was like an atomic explosion. The
Netherland delegate asked me to resign immediately, the French were very upset.
Other delegations, however, were more in favour to see what we could propose.
We needed to react quickly. Two days after the Finance Committee, we made the
first decisions. To recuperate the prototyping money out of a reduction, smeared over
the years up to 2009, in CERN expenses on R&D, except for the Compact Linear
Collider (CLIC), and in Lab consolidation. This would reduce LHC overcosts by 180
MCHF.
To assess how much could be further recuperated, we needed a fast and detailed re-
view of all Laboratory activities. To this aim, we appointed five “Task Forces” chaired
by recognised experts from the Lab on five critical issues: Research Programs, chair
Dieter Schlatter, TF1; Organisation, chair Horst Wenninger, TF2; Industrial Sup-
port and Contracts, chair Karl Heinz Kissler, TF3; Personnel, chair John Ferguson,
TF4; LHC and other Accelerators, chair Steve Myers, TF5. The Task Forces started
immediately and produced first results before the Committee of Council meeting of
November.
We also scheduled a campaign of in-house communication involving myself and
all members of the Directorate, to illustrate the situation with Council and our lines
of action.
In the following days, we also realised that there was a fault of perspective in our
way to see things, and a fault of communication in our relations with Council.
At least unconsciously, we tended to blame Council for the 1996 cut. They had
taken the water out of the laboratory in which the fish of cost overruns could swim
(as it had always happened for large projects everywhere) and now it was up to them
to put back the money.
It was obviously a wrong attitude. Council delegates had followed the instructions
of their Governments and had done their best to smooth out the difficulties to CERN.
In addition, CERN had anyway committed itself to do the LHC within that budget,
and now it had to comply — a conversation with Charles Kleiber, the Swiss Secretary
of State for Science, and a confidential message by Peter Minkowski, a distinguished
Bern physicist who was advising the Swiss delegation, had been quite illuminating,
in this respect.
Finally, putting all difficulties in a single package had been a clear communication
mistake.
To correct the communication side, I followed the suggestion of the Director of
Administration, Jan van der Boone, and we asked a Public Relation company, Saatchi
& Saatchi, to advise us in our communications to Council, starting with the Com-
mittee of Council meeting in November. It proved to be a very good idea and the
support of an expert in communication has been crucial to overcome diffidences and
misunderstandings.
The Finance Committee met on November 6. The expert of Saatchi & Saatchi had
made long, soul searching, interviews with me and with the other Directors, asking
about our assessment of the situation and our objectives. On the basis of a draft made
by the expert, I prepared a written intervention to be read as an introduction to the
financial situation and reported in the minutes of the meeting.
I started from the 1996 cut. The cut in the budget should have produced — I
admitted — a thorough revision of CERN activities. But the urgency of the message
has not been clearly perceived. The problem had been further complicated by the
need to maintain the vitality of CERN and, in fact, high level scientific results had
been obtained, such as the discovery of direct CP violation and the likely observation
of a new phase of matter in heavy ion collisions.
The way in which we at CERN addressed the LHC funding issue has not reflected
well on us. I want to apologise for this and make it clear that I accept full responsibility.
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There have been failures in management judgement and in communication —
especially communication, I believe. But I’d like to stress that the LHC project itself
remains technically and scientifically sound.
Then followed the key messages.
CERN was committed to deliver LHC within the agreed budget and it remains
committed to doing this — if Council so decides.
My personal view is that steps necessary to deliver without additional funding may
not be in best long-term interests of the Organisation. Hence, we will be asking Council
to consider other options.
We recognise that none of these — about to be presented in detail — may be wholly
satisfactory. Consider them as a starting point in a dialogue process.
Fig. 10: Extracosts of the LHC project as reported in the Finance Committee of November 6,
2001. The figures confirmed, with small variations, those reported to the Finance Committee
of Sept. 19, shown in the column on the left.
In the following, I confirmed the September costs, informed about the first mea-
sures taken to absorb part of the deficit in the Laboratory’s budget (Fig. 10), and
gave details on the Task Forces that had to determine, within a short delay, the extent
to which the Laboratory could absorb the extra deficit and show where we would hit
the hard rock (i.e. cuts would affect the LHC itself).
Another argument on the table, discussed at long by Finance Committee dele-
gates, was that of establishing an External Review Committee (ERC), to have an
independent assessment of the LHC cost and of the ways the Laboratory was dealing
with LHC construction.
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I was completely confident of our cost estimate, but got also convinced that an
external review was a necessary step to re-establish Council confidence in the Labo-
ratory and to support delegates action vis-a-vis their Governments, even at the risk
of putting Management under external control.
At the end, to give substance to our statements, I presented a roadmap (Fig. 11),
of the steps to include the new cost to completion in a Medium Term Plan and a
Long Term Projection replacing the ones made before the crisis, in June 2001.
Fig. 11: Slide presented at Finance Committee of November 6, 2001, with the roadmap to
arrive in June 2002 to a new Medium Term Plan and a Long Term Projection including the
revised LHC cost-to-completion.
In a letter sent personally to all members of staff, I summarised the situation after
the Finance Committee and tried to indicate how we could get out of the mess.
Dear Colleague,
As you know the LHC will cost more than was originally planned. CERN must
do its part, and a sizeable fraction of the deficit will have to be found within our own
budget.
The time has come to examine how to re-align the future organisation of our
Laboratory to this new reality.
I am determined to keep you fully informed of developments. All the facts are
already on the CERN home page (see Special Announcements) but with this letter I
would like to address you personally.
There is need for change. Resources must be focused on the LHC, in particular
human resources. I am fully committed to leading this change.
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At the same time, it will be essential to preserve a limited but vital core of diver-
sified activities and know-how, which make the strength of CERN and represent the
seeds for the future of the Organisation and of particle physics, beyond the LHC.
The Finance Committee meeting on November 6 was the first step in the dia-
logue with the Member States. The discussion was critical but constructive with all
delegations expressing strong support for the LHC project.
I have created special Task Forces to determine: the cost of different programmes,
areas of savings across the Laboratory; restructuring; improved tools for managing
CERN resources.
Full information on the composition of these Task Forces is also available on the
homepage. I encourage you all to be active in this process. Your ideas are important.
All of us are committed to CERN as an institution and the ideals it represents.
Doing what is best for science will be our guiding principle in moving forward.
We have enormous challenges ahead and there are no short cuts.
With your input and support I am confident we will define a solution, which will
allow us to complete the LHC successfully and guarantee a future of scientific excel-
lence for CERN.
The motto of these days was that the crisis represented also an opportunity to
strengthen structure and scopes of the Laboratory. This was exemplified in a slide I
showed several times, passed to me by Jan van der Boone (Fig 12). A posteriori, I
can say it is exactly what happened.
Fig. 12: Crisis = Danger + Opportunity, the motto of the years 2001-2003.
Since October 2001, I was working on what we would call later a balanced package.
With the help of Task Forces, we could focus the Laboratory and simplify the Organ-
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isation, directing to the LHC the resources made available, in material and personnel.
We could go roughly half way on the extra cost but the rest should be made available
by Council. How?
I was already getting indications from Lyn that cable production was not going
to meet the stringent time scales set in the contracts. Reporting the commissioning
of the LHC, one could recuperate the rest of the missing resources out of the margin
that a constant budget contained in the extra years, without having to ask for an
additional contribution from Member States, by then totally unrealistic. This is where
the agreement of Council was essential and what was realistic to ask.
For the time being, however, this was only a working hypothesis, vaguely alluded
to in our communications. By the way, it gave substance to a mantra that Chris had
been often repeating: time is LHC contingency.
The Committee of Council that followed took the new step, establishing an Ex-
ternal Review Committee.
Following our proposal, the Committee of Council appointed Robert Aymar to
chair the External Review Committee. A well known expert in superconducting mag-
nets, Aymar had made a revision of the ITER project, including a new cost assess-
ment, and was already familiar with the LHC, having refereed the project of the
superconducting magnets. The Committee of Council gave him the task of selecting
his fellows commissioners, to be appointed by the Council of December 2001.
The balanced package took shape in January 2001, with the first conclusions of
the Task Forces just made available.
In the Directorate, we made a review of superconducting cable production, with
the conclusion that it could not be completed before the end of 2005. This meant
reporting LHC commissioning to mid 2007, a two year delay with respect to the
original 2005 schedule announced by Chris in 1996.
Roger Cashmore insisted for a really in-depth examination, in regard to the exper-
imental collaborations, which were not going to be happy with the delay, but Lyn did
not leave any doubt. Even with the recent addition of a new company, Outokumpo
from Finland, and with the new production centre in Brugg, Switzerland, the end of
2005 was just barely possible.
Reporting the LHC made it possible to follow one of the Task Forces suggestions,
namely to close CERN accelerators for one full year, in 2005. We had already decided
a 30% cut to the PS and SPS running time, but a one year suspension allowed to
recuperate substantial material and personnel resources to focus on LHC installation.
In addition, we reduced R&D efforts in CERN to the development of the Compact
Linear Collider (CLIC) only. Finally, the extension of the construction period allowed
to attenuate the computing power problem, diluting the expenses over six, rather
than four, years.
With the experimental and accelerator programs thus restricted, the full exper-
imental community insisting on CERN was aligned on the LHC program and no
further cuts were possible, we had gone to hit the hard rock. We could now ask Coun-
cil to extend by two years the constant budget regime agreed in 1996, from 2009 to
2011, and this would produce enough resources to complete safely the LHC.
We presented the new schedule to the Committee of Council in March 2002 (see
Fig. 13), and the new Medium Term Plan and Long Term Projection to the Council
of June 2002, as promised.
In spring 2002, another problem came to the fore. Companies want to be paid
shortly after delivery and, with cables and magnets arriving in the Laboratory, pay-
ments would pile up quickly. We had a constant budget but were heading toward a
peak of the spending.
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Fig. 13: The LHC timeline 2002-2012. Upper left: Schedule proposed in 2002. In clockwise
order: Delivery of superconducting cables, completed in November 2005; Reception of the
last superconducting dipole by Lyn Evans (left) and Lucio Rossi (right), November 2006;
Beam commissioning, September 2008; Steve Myers, Project Leader from 2008; Delays due
to QRL and to the 2008 accident; First physics 2011-2012.
Of course, LEP had gone through the same problem, and it was solved by taking
a loan from a consortium of banks. We went back to the same consortium, but the
answer was very negative. At best, we would obtain only very expensive loans.
A year before, in May 2001, we had created an association with ESA, ESO and
other European Research Organisations, called EIROforum (European Intergovern-
mental Research Organisations) and we had periodic meetings in Bruxelles with
Philippe Busquin, the European Commissioner. During an informal dinner follow-
ing one of these meetings, I asked Busquin: “How is Europe going to finance the
expenditure peak of ITER?”. Answer: “The European Investment Bank will make a
loan.”
So, back in CERN I sent Andre´ Naudi, Head of the Finance Division, to discuss
with the European Investment Bank (EIB) the perspective of a loan and it turned
out that they were very positive.
In December 2002, together with the approval of the new Plan, Council authorised
us to finalise the negotiations with EIB, which ended up in Luxembourg (December
19, 2002) with the signature of a 300 million Euros loan, at 4% annual interest rate
(CERN got a triple A status) (Fig. 15). This was the final step for the resolution of
the cost crisis started in September 2001.
The cost to completion of LHC and related infrastructures presented in December
2002, the best estimate that our Management could offer to Council, is reported on
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Fig. 14: Estimate of the cost to completion of LHC and related infrastructures, in Millions
CHF, presented at Finance Committee and Council of December 2002. For the final costs,
see Tab. 1.
Fig. 15. Later, I was happy to see the agreement with the final result, reported in a
CERN document in 2009 (Tab. 1).
Personnel Material Total
Machine and Experimental Areas 1 150 3 685 4 835
Injectors 86 67 153
Detectors: construction, R&D 879 312 1 191
Detectors: test and pre-operation – 181 181
LHC Computing 86 93 179
Grand Total 2 202 4 337 6 539
Table 1: Cost to CERN of LHC and associated detectors, in Millions CHF. Source:
CERN/2840, May 27, 2009.
A few final considerations about the works of the External Review Committee
and the reactions of CERN personnel.
The ERC was for us a powerful stimulus to go quickly to the solution of the
cost problem, using our knowledge of the system and the results of the Task Forces.
Indeed, we arrived at the March 2002 meeting with a plan already well developed,
when the ERC presented the first report on their assessment of the situation. The good
relations of the Directorate with the ERC, Aymar in particular, did avoid dangerous
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confrontations. In substance, the ERC was functional not much to suggest the way
out to the problem, as to certify for Council that our proposals were sound.
CERN staff was, like us, very conscious that the issue at stake was the very
survival of CERN. With the communication line established by the Task Forces,
tensions between Management and Staff were limited to a minimum, unlike what had
happened in the LEP story.
All in all, I think the way the various actors behaved, Council, Management, ERC
and Staff, makes a success story about how one can bring back to safety the trajectory
of a large body running toward disaster, without making dramatic revolutions.
Fig. 15: Signing of CERN’s 300 million EUR loan from the European Investment Bank in
December 2002. From left: Philippe Busquin, European Research Commissioner, Philippe
Maystadt, EIB President, and Luciano Maiani, Director General of CERN (Photo CERN).
9 The LHC Final Timeline
L. B. From 2002 to 2012, there were still 10 years to go: what happened then?
L. M. Let me make a step back.
At the beginning of 2002, when Council started to look for the next Director
General, I declared that I did not want to be prolonged in any case, because of my
family problems. Pucci’s very serious illness had manifested itself few months before,
and developed during the time of the cost crisis until her death, in May 2003.
At the end of 2002, Robert Aymar was elected Director General, to take function
one year later, January 1st, 2004.
It was a natural and very good choice, given his experience with large projects
and the knowledge of the Laboratory he had acquired with the ERC. Working well
with Lyn as Project leader, Aymar led the LHC to its first important success, beam
commissioning, September 10, 2008, about 1 and 1/2 year later than foreseen in our
2002 schedule.
In fact, the delivery of the superconducting cables had gone essentially on schedule
and so the delivery of the dipoles, the last one arriving on November 27, 2006 (Fig. 13),
only five months off schedule.
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What had gone wrong was the superfluid helium distribution line, that had been
discovered at delivery not to comply with project specifications. Finally, the distri-
bution line was made at CERN, and that produced one good year delay.
The rest is a well known story.
One week after commissioning, a catastrophic superconductivity quench was caused
by a faulty connection between two dipoles. In the following explosion, about fifty
magnets were destroyed in the tunnel, fortunately with no human losses. The following
analysis showed that faulty connections were spread all over the machine.
Led by Steve Myers, who had replaced Lyn after his retirement, the CERN team
introduced very sensitive resistance monitors, that would signal tiny losses of con-
ductivity in time to prevent the quench, and made possible to run the machine at
smaller energy and luminosity, starting at the beginning of 2010, with physics runs
taking place in 2011.
After little more than one year running, as anticipated at LEP time, the discovery
of the Higgs boson was announced in the CERN auditorium. It was a memorable
session, chaired by the CERN Director General Rolph Heuer in the morning of July
4th, 2012, when Fabiola Gianotti (ATLAS leader) and Joe Incandela (CMS leader)
announced that the signal observed by each experimental Collaboration had gone
above the fateful level of 5 σs.
Francois Englert and Peter Higgs were both present at the session, which was
video transmitted all over the world. Global Press cover was assured, well beyond
the scientific interest, by the (totally baseless) claims that the LHC collisions could
produce a black hole that would eat up our whole planet.
Starting from spring 2013, magnet interconnections have been redone, Fabiola
Gianotti has taken over as CERN DG since January 1st, 2016. The LHC is now
running under her leadership at full project energy and luminosity, searching for new
phenomena above the Electroweak scale.
The LHC story is very telling about modern particle physics and its people.
The Higgs boson discovery is, of course, a great success of machine builders and
tells a lot about effectiveness and continuity in CERN’s Management. From LHC
conception to the Higgs boson it took three Project Directors (Giorgio Brianti, Lyn
Evans, Steve Myers) and five Directors General (Carlo Rubbia, Chris Llewellyn Smith,
Luciano Maiani, Robert Aymar, Rolph Heuer) each carrying on his part of the burden
during his term.
The experimental Collaborations have also fared exceptionally well. The bet on
luminosity has been completely won by detector builders, who are now planning a
further increase in luminosity of a factor of ten, leading to the High Luminosity LHC.
In the announcement of July 4th 2012, Fabiola Gianotti mentioned the great
challenge of distinguishing among the several collision vertices from which particles
originate when proton bunches cross, it was about 25 vertices/bunch crossing, but is
now faring well above 100 vertices/ bunch crossing.
She also mentioned the exceptionally big computing challenge posed by the anal-
ysis of LHC data, now well above Petabyte/year. The computing challenge was met
with the LHC Data GRID: a network covering all the Globe, with primary nodes
(Tier 1) in different continents where LHC data are stored and can be accessed by a
community of users similarly spread all over the Planet.
The Data Grid was proposed at the end of the 1990s [Foster & Kesselman 1999]
and pioneered by CERN from 2002 onwards and by other scientific enterprises such
as the Laser Interferometer Gravitational Wave Observatory (LIGO), and the Sloan
Digital Sky Survey (SDSS). In the outside world, the concept is often referred to as
The Cloud. After the World Wide Web, it is a major contribution of Fundamental
Research to our society.
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10 Future?
L. B. After a forty-year search, the detection of the Higgs boson at CERN marked
the beginning of a new era in particle physics, making Europe the undisputed leader
in the field. But this is not the end of the story. . .What are the perspectives and
new challenges of high-energy physics beyond LHC and the open questions that the
LHC’s successor should answer? Moreover, there is still the hot pending question of
detecting dark matter particles. . .
L. M. The Higgs boson discovery is not the end of particle physics.
For a satisfactory theory of the fundamental interactions, there remain, among
others, the problems of the mass hierarchy, the unification of strong and electroweak
forces and that of all interactions, including gravity. There is, in addition the problem
to identify the nature of the “dark matter”, revealed by astronomical observations
to be the dominant component of matter in the Universe, perhaps related to the
existence of the very same particles necessary to solve the mass hierarchy problem
(see Box 1).
We may have guessed some real issues: compositeness, supersymmetry, but there
are so many things we do not fully understand that the physics we may expect to
find beyond the Standard Theory is likely to be entirely new, strange and unexpected.
We need experiments to guide our intuition.
The key to the unification problems may well be at super-high energies, out of
reach of today conceivable accelerator technologies and rather to be found with un-
derground laboratories (e.g. the lifetime of the proton) and the observation of the
very Early Universe. However there is the concrete possibility that the answer for the
hierarchy and the dark matter puzzles is resolved by particles with masses in the few
to several TeV region (see again Box 1), which are amenable to accelerator searches.
A first exploration of this region will be performed with the ongoing Run 2 of
LHC and, later with the High Luminosity LHC, an increase of luminosity by a factor
10, which will bring the discovery potential of new particles around 3 TeV.
It is also possible to double the LHC energy by utilising, in the same tunnel, more
powerful magnets, based on Nb3Tin superconducting cables. It is hoped that in this
way one could detect, in the next decade, concrete indications of new physics beyond
the Standard Theory.
With the tunnel limitation, however, it is not likely that the LHC can get to a
complete view of the new physics implied by, e.g. SUSY or Technicolor: we need to
plan for more powerful accelerators. What’s next?
An early proposal is the International Linear Collider, a linear accelerator pro-
ducing e+e− collisions at centre-of-mass energy of 0.5 TeV. Purpose of the ILC would
be to study with great precision the properties of the Higgs boson and search for devi-
ations from the Standard Theory that would indicate new particles at higher energy,
like the Blue Band plot (Fig. 1) did for the Higgs boson.
With the sequence: LHC-ILC one would repeat the alternation of discovery/pre-
cision machines that was so successful with the Spp¯-LEP sequence.
For the ILC, there is one site approved in Japan (at Kitakami) and one reserve
site (at Sefuri), but funding is still to be defined.
Alternatively, one may try to repeat the LEP-LHC strategy with a large circular
tunnel. The proposal is to install in a large tunnel of 70 − 100 km a circular e+e−
machine with 250 − 300 GeV for precision study of the Higgs boson, to be replaced
later by a p− p collider of 80− 100 TeV, to explore the full region left by LHC, from
3 to 10 TeV.
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Two projects of this kind are being proposed. At CERN the Future Circular
Collider, and in China the Circular electron-positron Collider, followed by the Cir-
cular proton-proton Collider, proposed by the International Institute of High Energy
Physics in Beijing.
A 100 TeV proton Collider would be a fantastic challenge for new innovative
technologies: material science, low temperatures, electronics, computing, big data. It
would be a strong attractor of young talents and of new ideas, to solve the hardest
scientific problems which we have been confronted in the last 100 years.
The problem is, of course, that of resources, human and financial, for such big
enterprises.
In the years 1950s, following the vision proposed in 1949 by the eminent physicist
Luis De Broglie, governments of Italy, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark
etc., united forces to make CERN: the European facility that none of them could
afford and which made it possible the exploration of the Microcosm that we have
seen.
My hope is that, by the 2030s or so, regional Laboratories of Europe, America,
Asia may unite in a Global Accelerator Network , that will make it possible to address
the problems raised by the success of the Standard Theory and the discovery of the
Higgs boson, by establishing and running the 100 TeV World machine we dream of
today.
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